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GLD-247        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-2551 
___________ 
 
IRVING COURTLEY JONES, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
CITY OF PHILADELPHIA VOTER REGISTRATION;  
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA OFFICE OF 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 2-12-cv-02331) 
District Judge:  Honorable J. William Ditter, Jr. 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action  
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
August 2, 2012 
 
Before:  FUENTES, GREENAWAY, JR. and BARRY, 
 
Circuit Judges 
(Opinion filed: August 29, 2012) 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
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Irving C. Jones appeals, pro se, from the District Court’s order dismissing his 
complaint and amended complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).  For the 
reasons set forth below, we will affirm. 
I. 
Jones alleged in his complaint that he was denied the right to vote in 
Pennsylvania’s April 2012 primary election.  Jones is a member of the Communist Party, 
which Jones conceded does not utilize primary elections to select its nominees for general 
elections.  Accordingly, in a primary election like the one in April, Jones only voted on 
bond issues and ballot questions.  There were no such bond issues or ballot questions on 
the April 2012 ballot.  Nonetheless, Jones went to his local polling place intending to cast 
a vote affirmatively signifying that he supported no candidate of the two major parties.  
The officials at the polling place attempted to set up a voting machine to record Jones’s 
“non-vote,” but they were unable to do so.  The officials then considered whether to 
allow him to cast a paper ballot.  However, after speaking with someone in technical 
support, they ultimately did not permit him to cast a vote.   
Jones sought an order requiring the Commonwealth to provide a way for “non 
votes” such as his to be registered.  In the alternative, he sought an order requiring 
Pennsylvania to conduct open primaries.  He also requested an end to Pennsylvania’s 
voter identification law, which he described as “unnecessary and intimidating.” 
 
3 
 
After granting Jones’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis, the District Court 
screened his complaint for legal sufficiency and dismissed it under 28 U.S.C. § 
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  Jones 
timely appealed.   
II. 
We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary 
review over the District Court’s sua sponte dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).  
Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).  The legal standard for dismissing 
a complaint for failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as that for 
dismissing a complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  See id.  “To survive a 
motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 
‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 
(2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
III. 
, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 
We agree with the District Court that Jones failed to state a claim based on the 
alleged denial of his right to vote in the April 2012 primary election.1
                                              
1 Jones invoked the Voting Rights Act and the 15th Amendment as the basis for his 
lawsuit.  Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, which was enacted pursuant to the 
enforcement powers of the 15th Amendment, prohibits denial or abridgement of the right 
to vote “on account of race or color” or on the basis that a person is a “member of a 
language minority group”  42 U.S.C. §§ 1973(a), 1973b(f)(2); see also Ortiz v. City of 
Phila. Office of City Comm’rs Voter Registration Div., 28 F.3d 306, 309 (3d Cir. 1994).  
Although Jones stated that he is African American, he has not alleged that he was denied 
  Jones is not a 
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member of a political party that selects its nominees by primary election in 
Pennsylvania.2  He contends that he is nonetheless entitled to vote in the primary 
elections that select the candidates for other parties.  This view has been consistently 
rejected by the Supreme Court, which has concluded that “nonparty members’ keen 
desire to participate in selection of the party’s nominee . . . ‘is overborne by the 
countervailing and legitimate right of the party to determine its own membership 
qualifications.’”  Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 583-84 (2000) (quoting 
Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 216 n.6 (1986)); see also Clingman 
v. Beaver
Of course, Jones does not actually want to help another political party select its 
nominees for the general election.  Rather, he desires to have the right to register a protest 
vote conveying that he “did not wish to vote for any candidate of either party.”  However, 
as the District Court correctly observed, the function of the election is to winnow out 
, 544 U.S. 581, 592-97 (2005). 
                                                                                                                                                  
the right to vote based on his race.  Construing his pro se complaint liberally, the District 
Court proceeded to analyze his claims as brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to enforce his 
right to vote or right to political expression under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, 
and we will do the same.  
2 As we discussed in Rogers v. Corbett, 468 F.3d 188, 190-91 (3d Cir. 2006), 
Pennsylvania utilizes a two-tiered approach for nominating candidates for general 
election.  Under this system, “major” parties in Pennsylvania—in effect, only the 
Democratic and Republican parties—nominate their candidates for the general election 
by way of a primary election, and “minor” parties, other political bodies, and independent 
candidates place names on the general election ballot by nomination petitions.  Id. (citing 
25 Pa. Stat. Ann. §§ 2831, 2862, 2872.2 & 2911).  Pennsylvania’s primary elections are 
“closed” primaries in that a person who is not a member of a party is not entitled to vote 
in the primary election of such a party.  25 Pa. Stat. Ann. §§ 2812 & 2832. 
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candidates, not to provide Jones a forum for expressing his disapproval of the major party 
candidates.  See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 438 (1992); see also id.
We also agree that Jones lacks standing to challenge Pennsylvania’s voter 
identification law.  
 at 441 
(rejecting a challenge to a ban on write-in voting as “nothing more than the insistence 
that the State record, count, and publish individual protests against the election system or 
the choices presented on the ballot”).  Accordingly, we agree with the District Court that 
Jones has no constitutional right to affirmatively vote for “no candidate” in the party 
primaries for which he is not a party member.   
See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).  His 
complaint indicated that he already possesses state-issued identification.  And he has not 
alleged that he has been or will be denied the right to vote under that law, or that he has 
otherwise suffered any cognizable injury.3
IV. 
 
Accordingly, because this appeal presents no substantial question, we will 
summarily affirm the judgment of the District Court.  See
                                              
3 We agree with the District Court that further amendment of Jones’s complaint would be 
futile.  See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 113, 14 (3d Cir. 2002). 
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